These are notes towards a book that will probably never be written.
Note that i am not an expert in these matters so there will probably be lots of mistakes.
note: this is NOT about propaganda, or about persuading others to think a certain thing. Rather, is about designing systems to allow people to think about things together.
a common theme: security:
how can we simultaneously prevent:
a common theme: effective cognition: ameliorate emergent biases
a common theme: supporting consensus vs. iconoclasts
group polarization effect
silent majority
willingness to punish wrongdoers
choice aversion
risk aversion
intrinsic vs. extrinsic motivation
todo read resnick book
effects of anonymity on individauls
social evaporative cooling
wisdom of crowds and markets information markets
madness of crowds
executives tend to be biased towards action (as opposed to conservativity and procedure)
anyone with goals tends to be biased against procedure
parties tend to encourage voting towards the party line
parties tend to encourage attacking the opposing parties, even to the point of blocking action without a constructive solution
popular (and unpopular) voting systems
cyclic preferences
perspectival systems
stuff from spatial theory notes e.g. agenda control thm, agenda control and cyclic prefs
liquid democracy
two-party domination
instability (e.g. how much must prefs change to get a 180 degree reversal in policy)
ratings/evaluations
problems with large committees
design-by-committee
todo include the stuff from my notes on that conference; notes are at CW i think, as well as on my website, i think: notes/groupDecisionMaking/od2003Notes.txt
true consensus voting
near consensus voting
supermajority voting
consensus voting encourages support of status quo
creation of losers (effect on community dynamics)
last minute
put off hard decisions
dont look weak to your base
pork/compromise
compromise leads to potentially getting stuck in local minima of proposal space
the problem with transparency
the problem with putting the 'final' compromise to a vote of the members
leaks
soviet circular flow of power
soviet hierarchical delegation
sortition
district representation vs at-large
gerrymandering
regulatory capture and, natural bias; e.g. example of proposal for grad student quiet zone, vs sociable reps
lobbying vs mass media advertising
should reps push policies they dont personally agree with?
cautionary example of US electoral college
pork
testimony
provenance
web-of-trust for identity/provenance
reputation chain for credibility
public key encryption
symmetric encryption
broadcast media media dynamics; 'new's; timescale; positive feedback loops
private media's customer are advertisers entertainment
public media is on the side of the organization
intimidation of media
libel, slander, defamation
whistleblower protections
anonymous whistleblower mechanisms
impossibility of internal compliance audits in the face of large whistleblower incentives
conspiracy (information-altering) theories
voting proportional rep. voting perspectival echo chamber collaborative filtering
peer reviewed journals
committees
congressional bill throughput
linearization and robert's rules
books wikis centralized db distributed db (semweb) version control WWW videos gossip (blogs, twitter, etc) individual beliefs
folksonomy
controlled vocabulary
mapping corresponding ontologies; mismatched ontologies
specialization of knowledge; fragmentation of research communities, jargon
irrational transitive democratic belief theorem
peer reviewed journals
protections of tenure system
certification of wikipedia versions
rating agencies political pressure after-the-fact potential legal liability for minority opinions due to discovery
constitutional amendments
eternal safeguards
constitutional vs common law safeguards
protests
revolutions dangerous situation when revolution can occur multiple times and people can be killed
legislative immunity
military coups, military support of revolutions
watchdogs
trials judge jury computation is not free
collective dynamics increase in size
turf-fighting putting off tough decisions unrepresentative decisions freedom of speech vs campaign finance stable attractors towards status-quo reinforcing institutions fragility from 'gene transfer' unlike eukaryotic evolution time to negotiate
deliberative polling
include this stuff frmo organizationalDecisionMakingSystems
also
cults
procedural decision-making roberts rules chair, appeal from decision of chair, us congress leadership agendasetting voting vs. 'rough consensus'
political parties, political party dominance, political party dynamics